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IF YOU’RE HURT, WHERE IS HOME?  
RECENTLY DRAFTED MINOR LEAGUE 
BASEBALL PLAYERS ARE COMPELLED TO  
BRING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
ACTION IN TEAM’S HOME STATE OR  




& LISA P. MASTERALEXIS
**
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In June 2009, Major League Baseball (MLB) unilaterally added two new 
clauses to the first year player contract that newly drafted players are required 
to sign after they are drafted in the June First-Year Player Draft.  The first, 
entitled Addendum F, requires players to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
home team for workers‟ compensation claims.1  Addendum F may also be 
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with the Major League Baseball Players Association. 
1. Major League Baseball First-Year Player Draft Contract, at add. F [hereinafter Addendum F].  
The full text reads 
As a material inducement for Club to employ Player‟s services, Player promises and 
agrees that any worker‟s compensation claim, dispute or cause of action arising out of 
Player‟s employment with Club shall be subject to the worker‟s compensation laws of the 
State of _______________ exclusively and not the worker‟s compensation laws of any 
other state.  Player further agrees that any claim, filing, petition or cause of action in any 
way relating to worker‟s compensation rights or benefits arising out of Player‟s 
employment with Club, including without limitation the applicability or enforceability of 
this Addendum F, shall be brought solely and exclusively with the courts or the Worker‟s 
Compensation Board (or such other tribunal or government entity with jurisdiction) of the 
State of _______________________. 
This addendum shall be void upon the assignment of this Minor League Uniform Player 
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used to require a workers‟ compensation claim to be filed outside the club‟s 
home state and in a state with laws more favorable to employers.2  The second, 
Addendum G, paragraph C, requires that, if a minor league player chooses to 
use his own physician to perform a medical procedure instead of the team 
physician, the minor league player must pay the difference between the team 
doctor‟s cost for treatment and the cost of his personal physician‟s care.3 
These new terms were unilaterally imposed on newly drafted players and 
were not negotiated with any union.  The Major League Baseball Players 
Association (MLBPA) does not represent minor league players, as it only 
represents “all Major League Players, and individuals who may become Major 
League Players during the term” of the Basic Agreement.4  At least one 
baseball agent believes that all MLB “clubs were insisting” that Addenda F 
and G be signed “in one form or another.”5  Rob Manfred, MLB Executive 
Vice President of Labor Relations, has stated that that is an “exaggeration” but 
that “a number of clubs are using them.”6 
Addenda F and G were promulgated by MLB, in our opinion, in response 
 
Contract to any other Major League Club or Minor League Club that is not a player 
development of Club. 
By signing this Minor League Uniform Player Contract and/or this Addendum F, Player 
acknowledges that he has read this Addendum F and enters into this Addendum F of his 
own free will and choice. 
2. Liz Mullen, Clubs Seek Friendly Venues for Workers Comp Cases, SPORTS BUS. J., Aug. 30-
Sept. 5, 2010, at 9. 
3. Major League Baseball First-Year Player Draft Contract, supra note 1, at add. G, ¶ C 
[hereinafter Addendum G].  The full text reads as follows: 
C.With respect to expenses paid by worker‟s compensation insurance or other surgical, 
medical or hospitalization insurance policy, if Player uses a physician, dentist or other 
medical service provider not designated by Club and incurs expenses greater than that 
which would have been incurred by using a Club-designated provider, then player shall 
reimburse Club for the excess cost of such medical services.  Club shall have the right to 
select any medical service provider other than a physician or dentist in the same manner 
in which Club has the right to select a physician or dentist pursuant to this Minor League 
Uniform Player Contract.  Club‟s right to select the place of delivery of professional 
services pursuant to this Minor League Uniform Player Contract may include a Club 
facility or the facility of another club, if Club is on the road. 
By signing this Minor League Uniform Player Contract and/or this Addendum G, Player 
acknowledges that he has read this Addendum G, has consulted with the advisors of his 
choice or had the opportunity to do so, understands the terms of this Addendum G and 
enters into this Addendum G of his own free will and choice. 
4. 2007-2011 Basic Agreement, art. II, p. 1 (2007), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_ 
english.pdf [hereinafter Basic Agreement].  
  5. Mullen, supra note 2. 
6. See id. 
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to Cavers v. Houston McLane Co., Inc.,7 a decision of the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court in which Eric Cavers (Cavers), a minor league baseball player 
and Maine resident, successfully argued that Maine workers‟ compensation 
laws applied to his employer, the Houston McLane Co., Inc., doing business as 
the Houston Astros Baseball Club (Astros), a Texas corporation.  Furthermore, 
Addenda F and G were likely promulgated in an effort to control the cost of 
workers‟ compensation for minor league players8 and also in response to a 
series of workers‟ compensation cases over the course of several years that 
were decided in favor of professional baseball players. 
This Article will examine the application of workers‟ compensation law to 
minor league professional athletes.  It will also argue that a minor league 
player should be able to bring a workers‟ compensation action in his home 
state and should not be compelled to bring the case in the home state of his 
employer/team or in another jurisdiction, for example Arizona, where the 
workers‟ compensation laws favor the employer.9  This Article will also argue 
that the imposition of Addenda F and G on minor league players is patently 
unfair and may limit the ability of an injured minor league player to obtain 
medical benefits.  Finally, this Article will conclude by suggesting some 
options available to players to address the unjust working conditions imposed 
on minor league baseball players. 
II.  WORKERS‟ COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES 
Prior to the enactment of workers‟ compensation laws, if an employee 
suffered an injury on the job, he or she would have to bring a civil lawsuit for 
negligence in court.10  In order to prevail in these cases, the worker had to 
prove that the employer was negligent.11  It was difficult for the average 
worker to win these lawsuits because the employers raised effective legal 
defenses, for example, claiming that the worker assumed the risk of the job, 
that the worker‟s conduct constituted contributory negligence, or that a fellow 
worker‟s negligence caused the injury.12  Further, the cost of litigation was 
burdensome to an out-of-work employee. 
In 1884, the German Compensation Act became the first significant piece 
 
7. Cavers v. Houston McLane Co. Inc., 958 A.2d 905 (Me. 2008). 
8. Mullen, supra note 2. 
9. Id. 
10. Gerald Herz, Professional Athletes and the Law of Workers’ Compensation: Rights and 
Remedies in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 17:1 (Gary A. Uberstine & Jeffery K. 
Pressman Eds., 2002). 
11. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.2 (1994). 
12. Id.  
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of legislation to eliminate the requirement that the worker prove that the 
employer was at fault in order to prevail, and this concept soon spread to the 
United States.13  In 1902, Maryland established an accident fund for disabled 
miners, and in 1909, Montana also passed legislation for miners‟ 
compensation.14  Both of these statutes, however, were declared 
unconstitutional.15  The states of New York, Iowa, and Washington passed 
workers‟ compensation statutes, and these statutes were declared constitutional 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1917.16 
In general, workers‟ compensation laws provide workers protections and 
benefits if they are injured on the job, and the laws eliminate the requirement 
that the worker prove that the employer‟s negligence caused the injury.17  This 
no fault system grants benefits for lost wages and medical expenses to workers 
and gives most employers immunity against most tort actions.18  Workers‟ 
compensation statutes provide that an injured employee give up his right to 
sue his employer in civil court for an injury suffered on the job in return for a 
no fault administrative system to determine if the injury was work-related and 
grant quick payment of benefits and medical treatment.19 
A typical workers‟ compensation statute provides an injured worker 
66.66% of his average weekly wage if he suffers a work-related injury and is 
unable to work.20  There are four categories of disability: temporary total 
disability, temporary partial disability, permanent partial disability, and 
permanent total disability.21  The injured worker also receives medical 
treatment, and some states allow this treatment to be for life.22 
In order to be eligible for workers‟ compensation, there has to be an 
employer-employee relationship between the parties, which is defined by 
statute.  In Massachusetts, for example, an employee is defined for workers‟ 
compensation purposes as “every person in the service of another under any 
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written . . . .”23  Massachusetts 
excludes some classes of workers from the definition of employee, such as 
 






19. Herz, supra note 10, § 17:1. 
20. Id. § 17:5. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at § 17:11 
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 152, § 1(4) (2011). 
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seamen engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, salesmen of real estate or 
consumer goods who work on a commission, and taxi drivers who lease their 
cabs.24 
In general, professional athletes are considered employees of their 
professional teams.25  However, some states, including Florida, specifically 
exclude professional athletes from the definition of employee in their workers‟ 
compensation statutes.26  In Massachusetts, professional athletes are partially 
excluded from the definition of employee.  Athletes are included if they are 
“persons employed to participate in organized professional athletics, while so 
employed, if their contracts of hire provide for the payment of wages during 
the period of any disability resulting from such employment.”27  In other 
words, a professional athlete in Massachusetts is excluded from workers‟ 
compensation benefits only if his contract calls for him to be paid even though 
he is injured and unable to play.  However, if the injury to the professional 
athlete prevents him from being paid the salary agreed to in his contract or 
earning money working at another job during the offseason, he would be 
eligible for workers‟ compensation benefits.28 
An injury must arise out of and be suffered in the course of the injured 
person‟s employment.29  For a professional baseball player, an example of a 
work-related injury would be throwing a ball in a professional game and 
ripping or tearing a muscle or ligament in his throwing arm.30  As discussed 
 
24. Id.  
25. Herz, supra note 10, at § 17:3. 
26. Id.  See also Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, Squeeze Play: Workers’ 
Compensation and the Professional Athlete, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 95, 127 (1995) for 
a detailed discussion of states that exclude professional athletes from workers‟ compensation statutes.     
Recent efforts by some states endeavor to restrict pro athlete access to workers‟ 
compensation benefits are unwarranted.  From its inception, the workers‟ compensation 
system has served many desirable goals.  Few can object to the desirability of certain, 
prompt, and reasonable compensation for occupational injuries.  As was clear at the 
beginning of the century, this can best be achieved through an administrative remedy, 
rather than the slow and costly judicial process.  An equally important by-product of this 
system is the creation of incentives for employers to improve workplace safety.  All of 
these objectives are jeopardized by squeezing the pro athlete from workers‟ compensation 
coverage.  Id. at 126-27. 
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1(4)(B) (2011). 
28. Many minor league baseball players work second jobs not related to baseball or play winter 
league baseball in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, or Mexico to earn extra money.   
29. Herz, supra note 10, at § 17:4. 
30. An example of a baseball work-related injury occurred on July 28, 2010 when Stephen 
Strasburg of the Washington Nationals was throwing pitches and warming up in the bullpen before a 
game.  He felt discomfort in his throwing shoulder, was scratched from the starting line-up, and was 
placed on the fifteen day disabled list.  Strasburg returned to pitch on August 10, 2010 but soon was 
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below, this is the type of work-related injury that befell Cavers on June 27, 
2004, while he was playing in the minor leagues for the Astros.31 
III. CAVERS V. HOUSTON ASTROS AND THE APPLICATION OF MAINE‟S LONG 
ARM STATUTE 
Cavers was a resident of Otisfield, Maine and attended Franklin Pierce 
College in New Hampshire on a baseball scholarship.32  After his junior year, 
he was drafted in the tenth round (the 304th overall selection) of the June 2004 
MLB amateur draft by the Astros.33  Cavers, a catcher, was assigned to play 
for the Astros‟ rookie league team in Greenville, Tennessee.  On June 27, 
2004, he injured his shoulder during a game when throwing a ball to second 
base.34  Cavers was placed on the disabled list and received treatment on his 
shoulder.  He remained with the Greenville Club until the end of the season 
and was then sent to Houston to see the Astros‟ team physician, who 
recommended six more months of rest and rehabilitation.35  During the period 
of time that he was injured and unable to play, Cavers received his full minor 
league salary, which, at the time, was $900 per month.36 
As the 2005 season approached, Cavers continued to have pain in his 
shoulder.37  He sought a second opinion from a doctor in Boston, who 
diagnosed him with a torn labrum and advised him to undergo arthroscopic 
surgery.38  Against the Astros‟ doctor‟s advice, Cavers underwent the surgery 
 
hurt again.  On August 27, 2010 the Nationals announced that Strasburg had suffered a significant 
tear in his ulnar collateral ligament and that he would undergo “Tommy John” surgery to repair it.  
Bill Ladson, Strasburg Likely Headed for Elbow Surgery, MLB.COM, Aug. 27, 2010, 
http://washington.nationals.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20100827&content_id=13983748&vkey= 
news_was&fext=.jsp&c_id=was.  Fortunately for Strasburg, he signed a four-year $15.1 million 
major league guaranteed contract when he was drafted in June 2009 and did not lose out on any 
salary.  ESPN News Services, Nats, Strasburg Beat Deadline, ESPN.COM, Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4403920. 
31. Cavers v. Houston McLane Co., 958 A.2d 905, 908 (Me. 2008). 
32. Id. at 907. 
33. Id. at 908. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.  
36. Cavers signed the Minor League Uniform Players Contract (MLUPC), which provides, 
among other things, that he would receive his full salary if he were injured during the season. 
MLUPC, ¶ VIII, B.  The MLUPC also provides that, if the minor league player is injured and 
receiving his full salary, any workers‟ compensation payments he receives or payment for medical 
expenses be turned over to the club.  MLUPC ¶ VIII, E. 
37. Cavers, 958 A.2d at 908.  
38. Id. 
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in March 2005.39  The Astros did not pay for the surgery.40  Cavers 
recuperated, was able to play baseball again, and was assigned to the Astros‟ 
Troy, New York minor league club for the end of the 2005 season.41  In 2006, 
Cavers played for the Lexington, Kentucky Legends, a Class A affiliate of the 
Astros.42  The Astros released Cavers after the 2006 season.43  None of the 
minor league teams that Cavers played for traveled to Maine.44 
Cavers began working as a carpenter in Maine and received some medical 
care for his shoulder in Maine.45  Cavers filed a petition for workers‟ 
compensation benefits from the Maine Workers‟ Compensation Board (Board) 
for payment of medical bills, principally for payment of his shoulder surgery, 
for which the Astros still had not paid.46  The Astros attempted to dismiss the 
matter before the Board, claiming that Maine lacked personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction.47  A Board hearing officer determined that the Board had 
personal jurisdiction over the Astros because Cavers was a resident of Maine 
when the injury occurred.48  The Board awarded payment of medical bills, 
including payment for the shoulder operation, but did not order “wage 
replacement benefits.”49  The Astros appealed the Board‟s award of medical 
benefits to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, claiming that the Board lacked 
personal jurisdiction in the case because the Astros were a Texas corporation 
and because it could not have anticipated litigating a workers‟ compensation 
case in Maine when it drafted and signed Cavers.50 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court first held that the fact Cavers had 
maintained his residence in Maine was enough to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on the Board over claims for work-related injuries received by the 
 
39. Id.  
40. It appears that the basis for the Astros refusal to pay for the operation was in ¶ VIII, C. of the 
MLUPC, which allowed the club to select the doctor and hospital that performs medical services on 
minor league players.  However, the MLUPC does not address the issue of a disagreement between 
the minor league player and a team concerning what specific medical procedure, if any, need be 
performed.  In this matter, Cavers believed that he needed an operation on his shoulder, and the 
Astros disagreed, believing that additional therapy and rest would cure his shoulder pain.  
41. Cavers, 958 A.2d at 908. 
42. Id. at 908-09. 
43. Id. at 909. 
44. Id.  
45. Id.  
46. Id. 
47. Id.   
48. Id. 
49. Id.  Cavers had been paid his full salary pursuant to MLUPC ¶ VII. B.; see Cavers, 958 A.2d 
at 908. 
50. Cavers, 958 A.2d at 909. 
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employee out of state.51  The court next applied the Maine long-arm statute52 
to determine if the Board had authority over Cavers‟ injury, which occurred in 
Tennessee while working for an out-of-state employer, the Texas-based 
Astros.53  The court held that, by negotiating with Cavers at his home in 
Maine and the fact that Cavers signed the contract in Maine, the Astros had 
transacted business in the state and was, thus, subject to the court‟s 
jurisdiction.54  The court continued and stated that the issue of the Board‟s 
authority over the Astros must be analyzed according to the due process and 
minimum contacts standards set out by the United States Supreme Court.55  
The court stated that due process is satisfied when “(1) Maine has a legitimate 
interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the defendant, by his or her 
conduct, reasonably could have anticipated litigation in Maine; and (3) the 
exercise of jurisdiction by Maine‟s courts comports with traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.”56 
The Astros did not contest the conclusion of the workers‟ compensation 
hearing officer that Maine has a legitimate and substantial interest in “ensuring 
that the burden of its residents‟ [work-related] injuries fall upon their employer 
rather than upon their communities,”57 the first due process element.  The 
Astros did take issue with the second element of analysis and argued that 
Cavers did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the Astros could have 
reasonably anticipated litigating a workers‟ compensation case in Maine.  The 
court held that the Astros had sufficient contact in Maine to anticipate 
litigation because the Astros had drafted a Maine resident, the Astros scouting 
director traveled to Maine to negotiate with Cavers, and Cavers signed his 
Astros contract in the state.58 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court cited the United States Supreme Court 
 
51. Id. See also Christiansen v. Elwin G. Smith, Inc., 598 A.2d 176, 177 (Me. 1991). 
52. The Maine Long-arm statute states, in relevant part, 
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an 
agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated in this section, thereby submits such 
person . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising 
from the doing of any of such acts:    
A.  The transaction of any business within this State . . . . 14 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704-
A(2) (2011). 
53. Cavers, 958 A.2d at 909.   
54. Id.  
55. Id. at 909-10 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) and Int‟l Shoe Co. v. 
Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
56. Id. at 910 (quoting Christiansen v. Elwin G. Smith Inc., 598 A.2d 176, 177 (Me. 1991)). 
57. Id. (quoting Christiansen, 598 A.2d at 177). 
58. Id. at 913. 
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case of Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of 
California59 as a basis for its decision.  In Alaska Packers, a person living in 
California executed an employment contract in California agreeing to work in 
Alaska during the salmon-canning season for specified wages and payment of 
transportation costs.  The employee was injured while working in Alaska.  
When he returned to California, he filed a workers‟ compensation claim in 
California and received an award for compensation.  The United States 
Supreme Court held for the worker and noted that 
an employment contract that is signed in a state, by a person 
living in that state, even if it is to be performed elsewhere, 
puts the obligations of the contract within the reach of the 
power that the state of residence may constitutionally exercise 
without violating the due process clause.60 
In Alaska Packers, the employment contract contained a clause requiring 
that any claim for workers‟ compensation must be brought in Alaska.61  
California‟s workers‟ compensation law had a provision allowing any 
California worker who signed an employment contract in the state to file a 
workers‟ compensation claim in California, regardless of whether the injury 
occurred “without the territorial limits of this state.”62  The Supreme Court 
agreed with the application of California law regardless of the employment 
contract language.63 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court then addressed the third element of the 
due process analysis, whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Maine 
comports with the traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”64  
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court analyzed the third element using “a variety 
of factors including the nature and purpose of defendant‟s contacts with the 
forum state, the connection between the contacts and the cause of action, the 
number of contacts, the interest of the forum state in the controversy, and the 
convenience and fairness to both parties.”65 
The court held that a minor league player and the team that signs him may 
anticipate that he could play a baseball game in “most, if not all, of the fifty 
 
59. Alaska Packers Ass‟n v. Indust. Accident Comm‟n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
60. Id. at 540-42. 
61. Id. at 538. 
62. Id.  
63. Id. at 543-50. 
64. Cavers v. Houston McLane Co., 958 A.2d 905, 910 (Me. 2008). 
65. Id. at 914 (quoting Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564, 570 (Me. 1979)). 
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states” in the United States.66  The Astros and all other major league teams 
have the resources to appear in any state and defend workers‟ compensation 
claims.  The court acknowledged that former minor league players might have 
great difficulty securing benefits in forums far from their home state.67  In 
reaching its decision in Cavers, the court quoted the United States Supreme 
Court in Alaska Packers:  
The probability is slight that injured workmen, once returned 
to California, would be able to retrace their steps to Alaska, 
and there successfully prosecute their claims for 
compensation.  Without a remedy in California, they would be 
remediless, and there was the danger that they might become 
public charges, both matters of grave public concern to the 
state.68 
On October 30, 2008, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held for Cavers, 
a minor league player who had been released after getting injured and who 
was now located thousands of miles away from the team that signed him 
trying to start a new career.  The court held that the fair play and substantial 
justice element of the analysis clearly favored Cavers, as he would find it 
difficult to pursue a workers‟ compensation remedy in Texas, and affirmed the 
Board‟s decision granting the payment of medical expenses.69 
IV.  OTHER MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL WORKERS‟ COMPENSATION CASES 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted other baseball workers‟ 
compensation cases that had similar facts and outcomes to the Cavers matter.  
In Bowen v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board,70 a California resident 
was drafted by the Florida Marlins in 1992 and signed the Minor League 
Uniform Player Contract (MLUPC) at his residence in California.71  Bowen 
negotiated the contract over the telephone with a Marlins scout who also lived 
in California.  The Marlins mailed the contract to Bowen after the terms had 
been agreed to via telephone.  Bowen began playing minor league baseball for 
the Marlins in 1993 and was assigned to a club in Erie, Pennsylvania.  He 
played minor league baseball for the Marlins from 1994 to 1996.  Bowen 
 
66. Id. 
67. Id.  
68. Id. (quoting Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added)). 
69. Id. 
70. Bowen v. Workers‟ Comp. Appeals Bd., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
71. Id. at 97. 
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never played baseball in California for the Marlins.72 
In April 1996, Bowen was injured while pitching in a game in Clearwater, 
Florida.  He was placed on the disabled list and pitched with discomfort for the 
rest of the 1996 season.  He was released by the Marlins at the end of the 1996 
season.73  Bowen applied for workers‟ compensation benefits in California, 
and his claim was at first denied by the Workers‟ Compensation Appeals 
Board.74  However, the California Appeals Court reversed, holding that “an 
employee who is a professional athlete residing in California, such as Bowen, 
who signs a player‟s contract in California furnished to the athlete here by an 
out-of-state team, is entitled to benefits under the act for injuries received 
while playing out of state under the contract.”75  As the Astros did in Cavers, 
the Marlins argued that they were denied due process because there were 
insufficient contacts with the State of California to support application of 
personal jurisdiction.  The appeals court rejected the Marlins argument and 
held for Bowen.76 
In a case decided in 2001, the California Court of Appeals, in New York 
Yankees v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, reached the same result on 
a workers‟ compensation claim filed by a New York Yankees pitcher, who 
was a resident of California but was injured during spring training in Florida.77 
The respective court decisions in Cavers in 2008, Bowen in 1999, and New 
York Yankees in 2001 demonstrate that state courts have developed a strong 
trend that minor league professional baseball players will be awarded workers‟ 
compensation benefits of their home states if the players are not excluded by 
statute and they are injured in service to their clubs.78  This is particularly 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id.  
74. Id. at 96. 
75. Id. at 104. 
76. Id. 
77. N.Y. Yankees v. Workers‟ Comp. Appeals Bd., No. D036556, 2001 Cal. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 
4872 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2001). 
78. Historically, there have been other cases that have held that workers‟ compensation statutes 
apply to professional baseball players.  In 1928, in the case of Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Huhn, 
142 S.E. 121, 125-26 (Ga. 1928), a Georgia court held that a professional baseball player is covered 
under the state workers‟ compensation act.  In Bayless v. Philadelphia Nat’l League Club, 472 F. 
Supp. 625, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff’d, 615 F.2d 1352 (3d Cir. 1980), the court held that the 
Pennsylvania‟s Workers‟ Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for a minor league pitcher‟s 
injuries.  In Texas, in U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 271 F.2d 955, 956 (5th 
Cir. 1959), the court affirmed a district court finding that the Texas workers‟ compensation statute 
applies to professional baseball player.  However, in 1991, the Texas legislature changed the law and 
required professional athletes to elect benefits under workers‟ compensation or their CBAs or their 
individual contracts.  The goal of this legislation was to “reduce expenses of major league sports 
franchises.”  House Comm. on Business and Commerce, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 428, 72nd Leg., 
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important to minor league players, as they do not make much money.  Typical 
minor league players like Cavers, who played Class A baseball, earn about 
$1,100 per month from April to September, or $5,500 per year.79  In contrast, 
the minimum salary for a major league player for the 2010 season was 
$400,000.80  In addition, a major league player who sustains an injury in a 
major league game and is unable to play will receive his full salary less any 
payments from workers‟ compensation.81  The Cavers, Bowen, and New York 
Yankees cases are important because a minor league player simply may not 
have the financial resources to litigate a workers‟ compensation case in a 
foreign state.82 
V.  THE DRAFT AND ADDENDUM F AND G: BASEBALL‟S RESPONSE TO 
CAVERS 
From June 9-11, 2009, six months after the Cavers decision forced the 
Houston Astros to pay for Cavers‟ shoulder operation and medical treatment, 
the 2009 MLB First-Year Player Draft was held.  The young men eligible for 
the draft are amateur baseball players from the United States, Canada, and 
Puerto Rico who have completed high school and college players who have 
completed their junior or senior years.83  Junior college players can be drafted 
regardless of how many years of college they have completed.84  Each of the 
thirty MLB teams selects amateur players to restock its organization.  The 
teams draft in “reverse order of their percentage games won at the close of the 
preceding championship season.”85  There are fifty rounds to the draft,86 and 
there are additional draft picks awarded to teams that lose type A or type B 
major league free agents to other clubs.87  In the 2010 First-Year Player Draft, 
 
R.S. (1991).  Carlin & Fairman, supra note 26, at 111 n.97. 
79. See Minor League Baseball Frequently Asked Questions, MINORLEAGUEBASEBALL.COM, 
http://web.minorleaguebaseball.com/milb/info/faq.jsp?mc=milb_info (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
80. Basic Agreement, supra note 4, § VI(B). 
81. Id. § IX(E). 
82. See also Rachel Schaffer, Grabbing Them by the Balls: Legislatures, Courts, and Team 
Owners Bar Non-Elite Professional Athletes from Workers’ Compensation, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL‟Y & LAW 623, 628 (2000).  Shaffer argues that non-elite athletes, such as minor league baseball 
players and particularly women athletes, do not receive adequate workers‟ compensation benefits, and 
exclusion of non-elite athletes from workers‟ compensation is wrong.  Id. 
83. Major League Rules, Rule 4 entitled First Year Player Draft, ¶(a), Players Subject.  See also 
First Year Player Draft, Official Rules, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
84. Major League Rules, supra note 83. 
85. Id. at r.4(c)(1), Order of Selection. 
86. Id. at (b), Selection Meeting. 
87. Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XX ¶ 4(a)-(c).  The relevant sections of paragraphs (b) 
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1525 amateur players were drafted.88 
After a MLB club drafts an amateur player, the player is placed on that 
club‟s exclusive negotiating list, and only the drafting club can attempt to sign 
him to a professional contract.89  A drafted player may sign a major league or 
a minor league contract with the club that drafted him or a player may choose 
to return to college if he still has eligibility to play college baseball.90 
Soon after the draft, players who were drafted begin negotiating terms of 
employment with the major league club that drafted them.  If they agree to 
terms, players are typically presented with the MLUPC to sign with several 
addenda.  However, for the first time, in 2009, accompanying the MLUPC 
were Addendum F and Addendum G.91  Addendum F required the minor 
league player to submit to the jurisdiction and to file any workers‟ 
compensation action in the team‟s home state or in another state that is 
selected by the club and written in the blank space provided on the 
document.92  At least one team, the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, who 
plays its games in Anaheim, California, designated the state of Arizona on 
Addendum F, presumably because that state‟s workers‟ compensation laws are 
more employer friendly than California‟s workers‟ compensation laws.93 
Addendum G required, in part, that the player reimburse the club for 
medical expenses for services performed by a doctor chosen by the player if 
the treatment by that doctor was more expensive than services that would have 
been performed by the team doctor.94  The authors submit that both of these 
 
and (c) state 
(b) A Type A Player shall be a Player who ranks in the upper twenty percent (20%) of his 
respective position group. A Type B Player shall be a Player who ranks in the upper forty 
percent (40%) but not in the upper twenty percent (20%) of his respective position group.  
(c) A Type A or B Player shall be subject to compensation only if (i) he signs a contract 
with another Club prior to December 1; or (ii) he is offered salary arbitration by his 
former Club on or before December 1 pursuant to Section B(3) of this Article XX and 
signs a contract with another Club. For such Type A Players, compensation to the 
Player‟s former Club shall be an amateur draft choice (“Regular Draft Choice”) of the 
signing Club and an added amateur draft choice (“Special Draft Choice”) in the Major 
League Rule 4 Draft. For such Type B Players, compensation to the Player‟s former Club 
shall be a Special Draft Choice in the Major League Rule 4 Draft.  
88. Draft Tracker, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/events/draft/y2010/ drafttracker.jsp?p=0 
&s=30&sc=pick_number&so=ascending&st=number&ft=RD&fv=52 (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
89. Major League Rules, supra note 83 at Rule 4(d), Effect of Selection of a Player.  
90. Id. at (c)(2)(B). 
91. See Addenda F & G, supra notes 1 and 3, for the relevant text of Addenda F & G. 
92. See Addendum F, supra note 1. 
93. Mullen, supra note 2. 
94. Addendum G, supra note 3. 
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provisions are, most likely, MLB‟s response to the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court‟s decision in Cavers. 
VI. PLAYER LEVERAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS 
A.  Most Minor League Baseball Players Have Limited Leverage 
Most drafted players would not have the leverage or bargaining power to 
negotiate the removal of Addenda F and G from the MLUPC.  The MLUPC 
was not negotiated with the MLBPA or any other union, and therefore, it is an 
individual contract between the club and the player.  Thus, in theory, a minor 
league player could object to Addenda F and G and refuse to sign the contract.  
However, the likely result of this is that, unless the player has great leverage, 
the team would simply refuse to sign the player and turn its attention to its 
forty-nine other drafted players.  
Of the approximately 1500 amateur players drafted, some are more skilled 
and, thus, have more bargaining power when negotiating with the major 
league club.  A drafted player who signs a minor league contract may receive a 
significant bonus if he is drafted in the first round of the draft.  In 2008, major 
league clubs spent a total of $188.3 million in bonuses for the entire draft, an 
increase of $34.7 million from 2007.95  In 2008, thirty major league clubs paid 
out a total of $68,966,000 to first round picks,  an average of $2,266,666 per 
player.96  A highly skilled player may have the leverage to sign a major league 
contract and, thus, become a member of the MLBPA.  In a typical draft, a very 
select few players have such leverage.  For instance, in 2008, only two players 
in the first round signed major league contracts, and the remaining twenty-
eight signed minor league contracts.97  But, for those who do, it means they 
have access to the terms and protections of the Basic Agreement that apply to 
the player.  For example, as noted previously, Stephen Strasburg of the 
Washington Nationals, the first pick in the 2009 First-Year Player Draft, 
signed a four-year, $15.1 million major league guaranteed contract after being 
drafted.98 
A player signing his first major league contract for the 2010 season 
received a minimum salary in the minor leagues of $32,500, paid over the 
 
95. Jim Callis, Ask BA, BASEBALLAMERICA.COM, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.baseballamerica. 
com/today/prospects/ask-ba/2009/267624.html. 
96. Maury Brown, First Round Draft Bonuses Totaled Nearly $69M, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM, Feb. 
17, 2009, http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2963:08-
first-round-mlb-draft-bonuses-totaled-nearly-69m&catid=30:mlb-news&Itemid=42. 
97. Id.  
98. ESPN News Services, supra note 31. 
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five-month minor league season, and had the ability to negotiate for a higher 
salary.99  For example, Strasburg negotiated a salary of $400,000 for 2009, $2 
million for 2010, $2.5 million in 2011, and $3 million in 2012, in addition to 
other terms totaling $15.1 million.100  In contrast, a first-year minor league 
player who signed a minor league contract for the 2010 season will be paid 
$1,100 per month for the five-month minor league season regardless of 
whether that player received a signing bonus.101 
The Basic Agreement, which applies to all players who sign a major 
league contract, provides far superior injury benefits than those provided in a 
minor league contract.  If a major league player disagrees with the team 
doctor‟s diagnosis of his work-related injury, he may receive a second opinion.  
The MLBPA and MLB clubs have agreed on a list of doctors by geographic 
area to provide medical services to players, and the club shall pay for the 
service.102  If the player wishes to use a doctor not on the list for a second 
opinion, the player and the club must agree in advance for authorization to 
perform the service and for the club to pay the doctor.103  If there is a 
disagreement between the player‟s doctor and the team doctor as to what 
procedure needs to be performed on the player, the MLBPA and the MLB 
clubs have agreed to encourage all parties to select a neutral third doctor to 
resolve the dispute.104  The MLUPC does provide that the club shall pay all 
reasonable and necessary hospital expenses for a player suffering a work-
related injury, but the club “shall always have the right to select the physician” 
to perform the service.105  However, the MLUPC does not contain any 
provision for a second opinion or for a neutral third-party doctor to resolve any 
dispute between the minor league player and his club. 
 Comparing the terms of a major league contract and the MLUPC, it is 
clear that major league players and minor league players who have signed a 
major league contract have rights far superior to minor league players who 
have signed a MLUPC with Addenda F and G controlling work-related 
injuries.  Given the fact that both major league and minor league players may 
be hurt playing the same game for the same employer/club, it is inconsistent 
and inequitable to treat the players differently.   
 
99. Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at art. VI ¶ B(1). 
100. Bill Shaikin & Dylan Hernandez, The Fabulous Forum: Strasburg Contract Numbers, 
LATIMES.COM, Aug. 17, 2009, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/sports_blog/2009/08/strasburg 
contract-numbers.html. 
101. See Minor League Baseball, supra note 79. 
102. Basic Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XIII (D). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at attachment 35. 
105. MLUPC, supra note 36, at art. VIII ¶ C. 
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Furthermore, baseball‟s antitrust exemption, codified in the Curt Flood 
Act of 1998,106 has enabled the minor leagues to prosper, despite the fact that 
many minor leaguers do not earn a “living wage.”107  The protection afforded 
to employers by the antitrust exemption keeps minor league players from 
challenging a system where, once drafted, a player‟s rights are held for seven 
years and there is neither free movement nor leverage for players to negotiate 
a fairer system.  Nearly one hundred years after American League Baseball 
Club of Chicago v. Chase, what the Supreme Court of New York described as 
an unlawful combination and a scheme that relegated players to a system of 
peonage, for which the court refused to grant an equitable remedy to the 
plaintiff team,108 to a degree continues to exist.  The antitrust exemption keeps 
 
106. The Curt Flood Act of 1998 applied antitrust laws to MLB players.  However, Section 3 of 
the Curt Flood Act amended Section 27 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. and reinforced that 
minor league baseball players were exempt from antitrust laws.  The amended Section 27 reads in 
part as follows: 
SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct, acts, practices, or 
agreements of persons in the business of organized professional major league baseball 
directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball players to play 
baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such 
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in 
by persons in any other professional sports business affecting interstate commerce. 
(b) No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for changing the 
application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than 
those set forth in subsection (a). This section does not create, permit or imply a cause of 
action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the antitrust 
laws to, any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that do not directly relate to or affect 
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level, 
including but not limited to - 
(1) any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons engaging in, conducting or 
participating in the business of organized professional baseball relating to or affecting 
employment to play baseball at the minor league level, any organized professional 
baseball amateur or first-year player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to minor 
league players; (emphasis added). 
107. A living wage is defined by Merriam-Webster‟s dictionary as a wage sufficient to provide 
the necessities and comforts essential to an acceptable standard of living.  Living Wage, 
MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/living+wage (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2010).  See also Living Wage Overview, BERKELEY.EDU, http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/ 
livingwage/overview.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2010).  While the living wage level varies among 
regions, the stated goal is to insure that workers receive a livelihood that allows a full time worker to 
provide food, housing, health care, child care, and basic transportation for themselves and their 
families. 
108. Am. League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 465-67 (N.Y. Supp. 1914).   
The system created by „organized baseball‟ in recent years presents the question of the 
establishment of a scheme by which the personal freedom, the right to contract for their 
labor wherever they will, of 10,000 skilled laborers, is placed under the dominion of a 
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minor league players from having the antitrust threat available in other 
professional leagues.  Because leagues, like no other workplace, rely so 
heavily on restrictive employment practices (e.g., drafts, salary caps, wage 
scales, free agency restraints), the professional sports workplace is a hotbed 
for antitrust challenges by players.109  Although there are pro-competitive 
reasons to justify the restrictive practices under a rule of reason argument, the 
threat of treble damages gets the league‟s attention in ways that contract or 
other legal claims do not.  The antitrust threat also encourages unionization in 
professional sports.  To achieve the labor exemption to antitrust, owners covet 
unionization in professional sports leagues in ways they might not in 
mainstream business.  To settle an antitrust suit, owners in professional sports 
will resort to collective bargaining.110  However, unionization in minor league 
baseball is more challenging to achieve due to the extreme leverage and 
disincentive for unionization afforded to management by baseball‟s 
exemption, the high rate of turnover of players, the vast geographic area of the 
minor league teams, the disparity in levels of talent between low A ball and 
AAA, and the fact that, by their nature and in the working environment they 
are in, the players are competing with each other rather than cooperating with 
one another.  Thus, the likelihood that antitrust or labor remedies available to 
other professional athletes will bridge the gap for minor league baseball 
players is unrealistic. 
 
benevolent despotism through the operation of the monopoly established by the National 
Agreement. This case does not present the simple question of a laborer who has entered 
into a fair contract for his personal services.” Id. at 466. 
109. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (challenging MLB‟s reserve system on antitrust 
grounds); Radovich v. Nat‟l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (challenging NFL‟s rule 
blacklisting player on antitrust grounds); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (challenging 
MLB‟s reserve system on antitrust grounds); Clarett v. Nat‟l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 
2004) (challenging NFL‟s draft eligibility restrictions on antitrust grounds); Powell v. Nat‟l Football 
League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989) (challenging NFL‟s right of first refusal-free agent 
compensation system on antitrust grounds); Wood v. Nat‟l Basketball Ass‟n, 809 F.2d 954 (2nd Cir. 
1987) (challenging NBA‟s draft, rookie salary cap, and player restraints on antitrust grounds); 
McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (challenging NHL‟s free agent 
compensation system on antitrust grounds); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (challenging NFL‟s draft  on antitrust grounds); Mackey v. Nat‟l Football League, 543 F.2d 
606 (8th Cir. 1976) (challenging NFL‟s Rozelle Rule restraints on free agency on antitrust grounds); 
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 97 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2000) (challenging MLS‟ single entity 
structure on antitrust grounds); McNeil v. Nat‟l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992) 
(challenging NFL‟s Plan B free agency restraints on antitrust grounds); Bridgeman v. Nat‟l Basketball 
Ass‟n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987) (challenging NBA‟s college player draft, salary cap, and right 
of first refusal on antitrust grounds).  
110. See White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1431-32 (D. Minn. 1993) aff’d, 41 
F.3d 402, 408-09 (8th Cir. 1994) (threatened antitrust class action by NFL players brought parties 
back to collective bargaining resulting in settlement with 1993 CBA). 
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B. Comparison to Minor League Hockey Players 
Minor league hockey players in the American Hockey League (AHL) and 
the ECHL are represented by the Professional Hockey Players Association 
(PHPA).  The collective bargaining agreements (CBA) in both leagues provide 
better benefits to minor league hockey players than their counterparts in minor 
league baseball.  
The AHL, which began operation in 1936, is comprised of thirty teams111 
and serves as the top developmental league for the National Hockey League 
(NHL).112  The minimum salary in the AHL for 2009-10 was $36,500 U.S. or 
$39,000 Canadian ($28,000 U.S, for players on loan to the AHL from lesser 
leagues) with $63 per diem.113  The CBA also provides that “if a player‟s 
injury is covered by Workers‟ Compensation, then his sole remedy shall be to 
pursue a claim before the Workers‟ Compensation Board in the appropriate 
jurisdiction.”114  Unlike the provisions of Addendum F, the CBA does not 
require the player to file a workers‟ compensation claim in the team‟s home 
state.  In addition, the CBA between the AHL and the PHPA provides benefits 
to players if they are playing in a jurisdiction that has exempted professional 
athletes from workers‟ compensation coverage.115  During the season, an 
injured player receives his full salary if he is injured during a game and unable 
to play.116  In the offseason, an injured player, not covered by workers‟ 
compensation, who has yet to fully recover, receives a benefit of $450.00 per 
week.117  If the team doctor and the player‟s doctor disagree about a player‟s 
injury and his ability to play, an independent doctor is selected to resolve the 
dispute.118 
The ECHL, formerly known as the East Coast Hockey League, is a minor 
league hockey league with twenty teams from Alaska to South Carolina.119  
Each team has twenty players on its active roster.120  The professional players 
 
111. Member Club Information, AHL.COM, http://theahl.com/team-directory-s11579 (last visited 
Aug. 7, 2010). 
112. Frequently Asked Questions, AHL.COM, http://theahl.com/faq-p137653 (last visited Aug. 7, 
2010). 
113. AMERICAN HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT: AHL/PHPA  art. VI 
(2009) [hereinafter AHL/PHPA CBA]. 
114. Id. at art. XII, § 1 ¶ 1. 
115. Carlin & Fairman, supra note 26. 
116. AMERICAN HOCKEY LEAGUE STANDARD PLAYER CONTRACT ¶ 5(d). 
117. AHL/PHPA CBA, supra note 113, at art. XII, §§ 1-2. 
118. Id. 
119. The East Coast Hockey League changed its name to the ECHL on May 19, 2003.  
Frequently Asked Questions, ECHL.COM, http://www.echl.com/faq.shtml (last visited Aug. 7, 2010). 
120. Id.  
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of the ECHL are collectively represented by the PHPA and also have a CBA 
with the ECHL.  The ECHL has a minimum weekly salary due to player 
movement.  The 2010-11 weekly minimum falls between $370 and $410 U.S., 
depending on a player‟s experience level, and the daily per diem is $36.121  
The CBA requires players be covered by workers‟ compensation, and if the 
home territory of the team does not require it, the team must provide “similar 
insurance.”122  An injured ECHL player continues to receive his full salary 
under the contract, and he receives medical care “as the [team‟s] physician 
may deem necessary.”123 
It is evident that unionized minor league hockey players, due to their 
ability to collectively bargain for wages and other employment provisions, 
earn better wages and are better protected than their nonunionized minor 
league baseball counterparts.  Further, when there is a dispute regarding the 
care, treatment, and financial coverage for the care and treatment of work-
related injuries, the ECHL CBA provides protections and remedies not 
available to similarly situated minor league baseball players. 
VII. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ARE 
PROFITABLE BUSINESSES AND IMPOSING ADDENDA F AND G ON MINOR 
LEAGUE PLAYERS IS FINANCIALLY UNNECESSARY AND UNFAIR 
Professional baseball is a very profitable business.  In 2009, MLB 
generated $6.6 billion in gross revenue.124  Today, minor league baseball clubs 
are also very valuable.  In 2008, on average, the top twenty minor league 
teams were worth $21.2 million and generated $9.8 million in revenue per 
team.125  Forty-nine percent of these revenues were generated from ticket 
sales.126  The major league teams cover the cost of developing the minor 
league players, as the costs for player salaries, bonuses, scouting, and coaches‟ 
salaries are paid for by the major league affiliates.127  As a result, the top 
twenty minor league clubs generated average operating income—defined as 
 
121. AHL/PHPA CBA, supra note 113, at art. VII § 2. 
122. Id. at art. XIV § 1. 
123. ECHL Standard Player Contract ¶ 7. 
124. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $6.6 Billion in Revenues in 2009, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM, 
Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id 
=4124:mlb-sees-a-record-66-billion-in-revenues-for-2009&catid=30:mlb-news&Itemid=42. 
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earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation—of $3 million.128 
In comparison to the enormous revenues of major league clubs and the 
success of several minor league teams, the average minor league player is 
impoverished.  The Federal Government‟s “Poverty Guidelines” for 2010 state 
that an individual is considered impoverished if he earns less than $10,830 per 
year.129  The average first-year minor league player makes $1,100 for the five 
months of the playing season, from April to the beginning of September, or 
$5,500 per year.130  The majority of players do not receive large signing 
bonuses upon agreeing to their first professional contract.131  The player is 
obligated to keep himself in shape and prepare for the upcoming season, all 
while attempting to find work in the offseason plus paying for his housing, 
food, and transportation.  It is easy to see that many minor league players will 
fall below the poverty line given the nature of their employment.  
With this economic background, the requirement that minor league players 
sign Addenda F and G is simply unfair.  With regard to Addendum F, the 
major league clubs and their minor league team affiliates are in a much better 
position financially to litigate workers‟ compensation claims in the home state 
of the player rather than submit to the jurisdiction of the club‟s home state.  
Further, it is incomprehensible that major league clubs, such as the Los 
Angeles Angels of Anaheim, are requiring players to consent to jurisdictions 
that are employer friendly and not their home state. 
In addition, if a player‟s personal physician is of the opinion that an 
expensive, but necessary, medical procedure is required and the club‟s 
physician disagrees, Addendum G requires that the player pay for the 
difference in treatment if the required treatment is more expensive.  Given the 
limited resources of minor league players, this could lead to an injured player 
foregoing treatment because he cannot afford it or acquiescing to the treatment 
suggested by the club‟s physician even if it does not address his ailment.  
Addenda F and G make it more difficult and more expensive for a minor 
league player to file a workers‟ compensation claim and receive medical 
treatment.  This is unacceptable in an industry that is thriving.  These addenda 
are unconscionable contracts of adhesion and seem to violate public policy due 
to the lack of bargaining power of the minor league players. 
 
128. Id. 
129. Fed. Reg., vol. 75, n. 148, Aug. 3, 2010, pp. 45628-29, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
poverty/figures-fed-reg.shtml see also http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/faq.shtml#differences. 
130. Official Info, MILB.COM, http://web.minorleaguebaseball.com/milb/info/faq.jsp?mc= 
milb_info (last visited Aug. 31, 2010). 
131. See supra Section V, A. of this Article. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Under United States Supreme Court precedent in Alaska Packers, an 
agreement by any employee to waive his right to workers‟ compensation is 
invalid.132  Although Addenda F and G are not waivers of workers‟ 
compensation rights, they have the effect of making it more difficult and 
expensive for a minor league player to file a workers‟ compensation claim, 
and the agreements may even prevent him from receiving a necessary medical 
procedure because he does not have the financial wherewithal to afford it.  As 
a result of the underlying unfairness to the players, this Article suggests that 
state workers‟ compensation boards and courts should ignore Addenda F and 
G and apply their typical jurisdictional criteria to the workers‟ compensation 
cases of minor league baseball players that come before them.133 
MLB should rescind Addenda F and G, as they are unfair to injured minor 
league players.  Addenda F and G do not comport with the “fair play and 
substantial justice” standards for due process and minimum contacts set out by 
the United States Supreme Court.134  Cavers, a Maine resident, was working 
for a Texas corporation, the Astros, and was injured while playing in a 
professional baseball game in Tennessee.  Applying the Supreme Court‟s logic 
in the Alaska Packers case to this matter, the “probability is slight” that Cavers 
“would be able to retrace” his “steps” to Tennessee or to Texas “and there 
successfully prosecute [his] claims for compensation.”135  Addenda F and G 
may lead to injured minor league players becoming “remediless” as the 
Supreme Court in Alaska Packers feared, and there is a “danger that they 
might become public charges.”136  The imposition of Addenda F and G on 
workers, the majority of whom are paid below the poverty line, is simply an 
unconscionable policy decision borne out of the loss by the Astros in the 
Cavers case.   
Another option, despite the hurdles raised previously, is for minor league 
baseball players to form a union to collectively bargain for better wages and 
working conditions, including injury protection.  Furthermore, issues have 
recently arisen that suggest that minor league baseball players should form a 
 
132. Alaska Packers Ass‟n v. Indus. Accident Comm‟n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 543 (1935).  See 
also Carlin & Fairman, supra note 26, at 100 n.27. 
133. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 7.40. 
134. Cavers v. Houston McLane Co., 958 A.2d 905, 909-10 (2008) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) and Int‟l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
135. Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 542; see also supra Section III of this Article.  Cavers never 
played baseball for the Astros in Texas.  He only visited Texas to be examined by the Astros‟ team 
doctor. 
136. Cavers, 958 A.2d at 914 (quoting Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 542). 
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union.  In July 2010, MLB Commissioner Allan H. “Bud” Selig announced 
that minor league players would be tested for human growth hormone (HGH) 
by drawing blood from the players.137  MLB was able to impose this new 
testing without approval of the minor league players because they are not part 
of a union and not subject to collective bargaining rules.138  The details of the 
blood test, including the level of the substance within the body, the ability to 
increase testing, and the blood drawing procedures, are solely up to MLB, and 
the minor league players have no input into the process.139  Unionization 
would ensure that the minor league players have the opportunity to negotiate 
for protections similar to those afforded their major league counterparts.  
Minor league players need to have a say in such terms and conditions of 
employment and, given these recent developments, should form a union to 
represent their interests.  It is clear that minor league hockey players in the 
AHL and ECHL have working conditions that are far more favorable because 
players are unionized and have negotiated more equitable terms in their 
respective CBAs.140 
A second option is for Congress to re-examine the antitrust exemption first 
granted to baseball by the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball Club v. 
National League141 and codified in the Curt Flood Act of 1998.142  
Professional baseball is able to maintain the rights of minor league players in 
one-sided contracts for seven years143 by virtue of this antitrust exemption.  
Without the antitrust exemption that professional baseball enjoys, players 
would be granted more individual bargaining power by the threat of 
challenging restrictive practices, such as below market wages and the reserve 
system.  For instance, with antitrust leverage, ostensibly, the owners would not 
be able to uniformly bind minor league players to their clubs for seven years, 
unless, of course, the players agreed collectively to such an imposition, and if 
that were the case, players would presumably receive something in exchange 
for agreeing to maintain the reserve system currently in existence.  Further, the 
 
137. Michael S. Schmidt, Baseball Using Minor Leagues for a Drug Test, NYTIMES.COM, July 
22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/sports/baseball/23doping.html.  
138. Id. 
139. Maury Brown, Rob Manfred on Minor League Drug Testing Program, FANGRAPHS.COM, 
Aug. 11, 2010, http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/rob-manfred-on-minor-league-drug-
testing-program/. 
140. See supra Section VI B. of this Article. 
141. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat‟l League of Prof‟l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (holding 
business of staging local professional baseball games through service contracts was not interstate 
commerce and exempt from Sherman Antitrust Act). 
142. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26(b) (2011). 
143. MLUPC, supra note 36, ¶ VI., Duration and Conditions of Employment 
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owners would have difficulty unilaterally imposing unfair terms upon them as 
contained in Addenda F and G, as players would have access to the same 
antitrust threat that major league players were granted by virtue of the Curt 
Flood Act.  Congress should explore why professional baseball is taking 
advantage of minor league players regarding an issue of their health when 
baseball is a very profitable business, in part because of the antitrust 
exemption.  Minor league hockey players in the AHL and ECHL are subject to 
antitrust laws and have far better wages and working conditions.  However, 
because the players in those leagues are unionized and negotiate CBAs, the 
leagues are afforded the labor exemption from antitrust liability for the 
provisions in their CBAs. 
And yet a third option might be to strengthen state workers‟ compensation 
laws to specifically allow residents to file workers‟ compensation claims in 
their home state regardless of any contractual agreement that their employers 
requires them to sign consenting to the jurisdiction of another state, thus 
following the logic in Alaska Packers.144  In conclusion, Addenda F and G do 
not comport with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and 
minor league baseball players should not be bound to the terms of Addenda F 
and G as they are unjust, they violate public policy, and they are in conflict 
with the letter and the spirit of the law proscribed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Alaska Packers.145 
 
 
144. Cavers v. Houston McLane Co., 958 A.2d 905, 909-910 (Me. 2008) (citing Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) and Int‟l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
145. Id. 
